R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33: Consent as it applies to sexual activity. Complainant consented to sex as long as accused wore a condom. Accused applied to have charge dismissed by a no-evidence motion. Trial judge granted motion; CA allowed Crown’s appeal, set aside acquittal and ordered a new trial, although the three judges split on the reasoning. Accused appeals re the setting aside of his acquittal. Appeal dismissed.
Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Martin, Kasirer and Jamal JJ.:
[2] I conclude that when consent to intercourse is conditioned on condom use, the only analytical framework consistent with the text, context and purpose of the prohibition against sexual assault is that there is no agreement to the physical act of intercourse without a condom. Sex with and without a condom are fundamentally and qualitatively distinct forms of physical touching. A complainant who consents to sex on the condition that their partner wear a condom does not consent to sex without a condom. This approach respects the provisions of the Criminal Code, this Court’s consistent jurisprudence on consent and sexual assault and Parliament’s intent to protect the sexual autonomy and human dignity of all persons in Canada. Since only yes means yes and no means no, it cannot be that “no, not without a condom” means “yes, without a condom”. If a complainant’s partner ignores their stipulation, the sexual intercourse is non-consensual and their sexual autonomy and equal sexual agency have been violated.
[3] Here, the complainant gave evidence that she had communicated to the appellant that her consent to sex was contingent on condom use. Despite the clear establishment of her physical boundaries, the appellant disregarded her wishes and did not wear a condom. This was evidence of a lack of subjective consent by the complainant — an element of the actus reus of sexual assault. As a result, the trial judge erred in granting the appellant’s no evidence motion. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal and uphold the order of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia setting aside the acquittal and remitting the matter to the Provincial Court of British Columbia for a new trial.
Wagner C.J. and Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ., concurring.
[109] We agree with our colleague Martin J. on the proper disposition of this appeal. We, too, would dismiss Mr. Kirkpatrick’s appeal and uphold the order of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia for a new trial.
…
[111] But that is not what this appeal is about. This appeal asks whether this Court may interpret the same provision of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, twice, in radically different ways, without overturning itself. Our colleague says it can. We say it cannot
R. v. Lafrance,2022 SCC 32: Issue of detention and right to counsel. Police suspected accused might have been involved in the death of the victim. They executed a search warrant and was interviewed. Three weeks later he was arrested, interviewed again and eventually confessed to killing the victim. At trial, accused sought to exclude his confession for a break of his right to counsel. Convicted by a jury of second-degree murder; appeal allowed and new trial ordered. Per Karakatsanis, Brown, Martin, Kasirer and JamalJJ.: appeal dismissed.
[5] I would dismiss the appeal. The police detained Mr. Lafrance on March 19, then breached s. 10(b) by failing to inform him of his right to counsel. They committed another breach of s. 10(b) on April 7 by refusing to allow him to contact a lawyer in circumstances which showed that his initial conversation with Legal Aid was insufficient for the purposes of s. 10(b), being “to allow the detainee not only to be informed of his rights and obligations under the law but, equally if not more important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise those rights” (Sinclair, at para. 26, citing R. v. Manninen, 1987 CanLII 67 (SCC) , [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, at pp. 1242-43). These were serious breaches, substantially impacting Mr. Lafrance’s Charter‑protected interests, and admitting the evidence thereby obtained would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Côté and Rowe JJ. dissenting:
[104] This case involves what should be a straightforward application of this Court’s jurisprudence under ss. 9 (the right against arbitrary detention), 10(b) (the right to retain and instruct counsel on detention) and 24(2) (exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence when its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The majority of this Court begins its analysis by acknowledging this, but proceeds to adopt interpretations of those sections that depart from that jurisprudence. We cannot agree with that approach and the proposed outcome of this case.
R. v. Sundman, 2022 SCC 31: Issue of whether accused should be convicted of first or second degree murder. Victim was unlawfully confined, but escaped before being murdered. Trial judge convicted on second degree murder, reasoning that the time between escape and murder meant he was no longer unlawfully confined. CA overturned, holding that the unlawful confinement was temporally and causally connected to the murder, making it a single transaction. Appeal dismissed. Per Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Brown, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer and Jamal JJ:
[5] I would dismiss the appeal. In my view, Mr. McLeod was still unlawfully confined when he escaped from the truck and ran for his life. Even though Mr. McLeod was not physically restrained outside the truck, he continued to be coercively restrained through violence, fear, and intimidation. He was deprived of his liberty and was not free to move about according to his inclination and desire. The appellant then murdered him while unlawfully confining him. These two distinct criminal acts were part of a continuous sequence of events forming a single transaction. They were close in time and involved an ongoing domination of Mr. McLeod that began in the truck, continued when he escaped from the truck and ran for his life, and ended with his murder. The appellant is therefore guilty of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.
R. v. Mazhari-Ravesh, 2022 MBCA 63: Appeal by accused of his conviction on six counts of sexual assault involving six different patients at his medical clinic. Accused and Crown apply for leave to appeal his sentence. Grounds for appeal include ineffective assistance of counsel, misapprehension of some of the expert’s evidence, and sentence imposed was harsh and excessive. Crown argues that the sentence was unfit.
R. v. Z. (M.J.), 2022 MBCA 61: Appeal of conviction of historical sexual assaults on the sole ground that the trial judge erred by dismissing his motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter based on a section 7 breach. CA found that trial judge did not make an express finding concerning a breach, but that a finding of no breach is implicit in her reasons. Error in law by failing to conclude there had been a section 7 violation. However, applying the correct law and balancing the seriousness of the charges, this is not a case where the exceptional remedy of a stay of proceedings is warranted. Appeal dismissed.
R. v. McLean, 2022 MBCA 60: Appeal of conviction for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and request for leave to appeal sentence. Accused was considered a courier at a mid-level of trafficking. Accused sought to have the drug evidence excluded, but was unsuccessful after a Garofoli review. Analysis of whether the trial judge incorrectly applied an adverse inference. Key sentencing controversy was parity. Extensive comparison and analysis of sentencing ranges for a mid-level courier. Conviction appeal denied; sentence reduced to nine years versus 12 years.
R. v. M.A.R.-S., 2022 MBQB 165: Sentencing decision after accused found guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference and sexual touching. Complainant was a child between the ages of 9-11 at the time. Principles of denunciation and deterrence are given primacy. Accused is considered to be a manageable risk in the community and a suitable candidate for supervised probation. Crown seeks a global sentence of eight years’ incarceration; defence submitted a global sentence of two years plus a further probationary period of three years. Bock, J. determines appropriate sentence is four years, six months.
R. v. Scott and Jack, 2022 MBQB 164: Trial over charge of first degree murder. Crown relies on significant video evidence from cameras in the vicinity as well as inadvertently through aand unrelated surveillance. Use of GPS tracking technology on vehicle used by accused. Evidence circumstantial; McKelvey, J. finds Scott as a principal and Jack as a participant, guilty of second degree murder.
R. v. Onakpoya, 2022 MBQB 158: Written reasons for denial of a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of right to be tried within a reasonable time. Accused charged June 26, 2019; trial rescheduled to September 26, 2022. Accused is representing herself. Parties agree that total delay is 39 months and two weeks. Grammond, J. determines net delay is 24 months and two weeks.
R. v. Sinclair, 2022 MBPC 40: Sentencing decision for conviction of communicating with a person under 18 for the purpose of sexual exploitation, commonly known as luring. Maximum jail sentence for s. 172.1(2) of the Criminal Code is 14 years and minimum is one year. Defense counsel challenges constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence. Crown argues for sentence of 3-5 years. Considerable analysis of relevant caselaw, including Friesen to determine which sentencing principles have priority. Accused sentenced to three years.
R. v. Harper, 2022 MBPC 37: Sentencing decision for offences of dangerous operation of a vehicle and assault with a weapon in incident of road rage. Accused pleaded guilty. Crown requests three years’ incarceration; defence requests nine months’ custody. No case law similar to the facts at bar. Martin, P.J. determines circumstances of offence require a custodial sentence; concurrent 10-month custodial sentence followed by 12 months of supervised probation.
Meryl Friedland and Dr. Andrew Haag. You Have the Right to be Read Something That You Probably Won’t Understand: Comprehensibility of the Right to Counsel. 2022 70 C.L.Q. 485 (WLC – LSM members can request a copy).
Without receiving a comprehensible right to counsel, detainees may not be receiving important protections relevant to significant choices that impact upon their liberty. A person who has been arrested or detained is immediately vulnerable relative to the state. They need to quickly make decisions that can affect the rest of their lives. With one misstep or misspeak, they can unknowingly incriminate themselves regardless of their actual innocence. While the right to counsel provides an opportunity to get advice on these decisions, a detainee cannot be expected to assert a right that they do not understand. The power imbalance that exists on arrest remains of the utmost importance in the discussion of Charter rights on arrest, and their purposive interpretation. The risks of false confessions that may follow a lack of legal advice, and wrongful convictions that can flow from this, loom large.
Janine Benedet. Amending Section 33.1: Extreme Intoxication and Sexual Assault. (2022) 80 C.R. (7th) 71. (WLC – LSM members can request a copy).
The new s. 33.1 applies to the same category of offences that the old provision did: general intent offences that contain an element of “an assault or any other interference or threat of interference by a person with the bodily integrity of another person.” This would mean all levels of assault and sexual assault, manslaughter and uttering threats. Other general intent offences would have access to the defence of extreme intoxication without restrictions, while those charged with specific intent offences such as murder and theft can still invoke the standard common law intoxication defence.