May 29, 2026. News Release.Report from Manitoba’s U.S. Representative on CUSMA Review – The findings of the report reiterate the importance of the agreement to Manitoba’s economy, which still relies heavily on exports to its North American partners, and underscores the need for stability and predictability in trade between the three countries, the premier noted.
Provincial Court Act (June 3, 2026) – As of July 1, 2026, the Associate Chief Judges of The Provincial Court will be: The Honourable Lee Ann M. Martin; The Honourable Geoffrey H. Bayly; and The Honourable David Ireland.
May 22, 2026. News Release. Province Further Updates Hepatitis A Vaccine Criteria – Manitoba Health, Seniors and Long-Term Care advises that free hepatitis A vaccines are now being offered to staff and volunteers of non-health-care, community-based organizations in Winnipeg who serve people experiencing homelessness.
In this release, the author has updated Chapter 3 (Annotations).
Highlights
Disposition Without Trial–Default Proceedings–Default Proceedings–Setting Aside–Generally – The Court has a broad discretion in the determination of whether a default judgment should be set aside. There is a distinction between setting aside the noting of default to allow a defence to be entered and setting aside default judgment. The test for setting aside default judgment in more onerous in nature. While the overriding consideration is whether setting aside the judgment would be just, the following is a non-exhaustive list of factors the court may consider:
(a) whether the defendant had an ongoing intention to defend; (b) whether the defendant adequately explained why there was a delay in filing the defence; (c) whether the delay in filing a defence was willful; (d) whether the motion to set aside the noting of default was brought with dispatch; and (e) whether the delay in filing a defence caused prejudice to the plaintiff.
Disposition Without Trial–Dismissal for Delay – In its Reasons for Decision, the Court sets out the rationale behind Rule 24.02 and a brief outline of the history leading to the status of the law, including how Rules 24.01 and 24.02 relate to one another and how they are to be applied. In this case, the court found that the conduct of the defendant, and any responsibility for the delay should be considered. While a defendant is entitled to take a “wait and see” approach to the litigation and thereby put the onus on moving the matter forward on the plaintiff, that approach is not without its parameters. If the defendant fails to discharge its obligations or communicate with the plaintiff in a timely way, it may be seen to be contributing to the overall delay. Parkinson v. Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, 2025 MBCA 82, per Mainella, J.A. (for the Court).
This release includes updates to Chapter 3 (Solicitor-and-Client Costs), Chapter 4 (Costs of Motions), Chapter 5 (Security for Costs), Chapter 6 (Assessment of Costs), Chapter 8 (Appeals), Chapter 11 (Costs in the Federal Court) and Chapter 14 (Costs in the Family Court and the Small Claims Court).
Highlights
Security for Costs–Appeals–General – The moving party in this appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was seeking an order for security for costs against the appellant in the amount of $100,000 relating to the appellant’s appeal of a wrongful dismissal finding against it that resulted in a damage award of $175,000. The moving party pursued two bases for the security for costs motion. (1) pursuant to rule 61.06(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Ont.) and rule 56.01(1)(d) on the grounds that there was “good reason to believe” that the appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal; and (2) pursuant to rule 61.06(1)(c) there was “other good reason” to order security for costs. The appeal court judge dismissed the motion. The judge stated the general legal principles. “There is a two-step process required before a discretionary order is made to order security for costs against an appellant pursuant to rule 61.06(1). The first question is whether the requirements of rule 61.06(1)(a), (b), or (c) are met. If so, the second question is whether it would be just to order security, considering the circumstances and the interests of justice.” [Paragraph 8]. [Citations omitted]. The relevant factors in deciding whether it would be just to order security are not closed. In the end the court did not find good cause for making a security for costs order. Stride v. Syra Group Holdings, 2025 A.C.W.S. 1762 (Ont. C.A.)
Assessment of Costs–The Assessment Officer–Costs of Assessment–Solicitor-and-client assessment – This was a motion in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice pursuant to rule 54.09(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Ont.) addressing an assessment under the Solicitors Act (Ont.). The assessment was conducted by an assessment officer. The respondent law firm opposed confirmation of the costs awarded arising out of the assessment. The client was awarded $90,000 in costs for her own time by the assessment officer. The client had retained the law firm regarding a property dispute. The action was partially successful. The assessment took place over 42 days in 2021. The reasons of the assessment officer were released in 2024. The law firm’s account was reduced by more than half. The client conducted the assessment on her own. The law firm opposed the award of $90,000 in costs on the very narrow ground that there was no evidence upon which the assessment officer could conclude that the client had forgone remunerative employment such that she should receive an award of costs for her time. The law firm did not challenge the time the client devoted to the assessment. In the end, the motion judge granted the appeal and awarded the client $40,000 in costs for her own efforts in the assessment. This motion was not a hearing de novo. The question was whether the assessment officer erred as a matter of principle. In the end, rather than send the matter back to the assessment officer the judge concluded that $40,000 was a reasonable fee particularly having regard to the fact that there was neither evidence of the extent of the forgone work nor an assessment of the hours worked by the client that would be work otherwise performed by a lawyer. Rosenberg v. MacDonald, 2025 ONSC 4455 (Ont. S.C.J.).
This release contains amendments and updates to the commentary in Chapter 2 (Assets); Chapter 3 (Claims Against the Estate for Debts); Chapter 4, (Expenses and Legal Costs); Chapter 5 (Bequests and Beneficiaries); Chapter 9 (Delegation to Agents); Chapter 11 (Executor’s Compensation); Chapter 15 (Resignation, Removal and Appointment of Trustees); Chapter 17 (Dependants’ Relief Claims); and Words and Phrases.
Highlights
Draft Will–Validation–Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 (SLRA), s 21.1(1) – This was an application to validate a draft will pursuant to s. 21.1(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 (SLRA). Without an order validating the draft will, the SLRA’s provisions on intestacy would govern the distribution of the deceased’s estate and his property would pass to his estranged surviving siblings and the children of his predeceased brother. The deceased had died suddenly after meeting with a lawyer who had drafted a will and powers of attorney for him. A letter from the lawyer, which the deceased had picked up, enclosed drafts of the will and power of attorney, confirmed an appointment for October 16, 2024 to sign the documents, and also stated: “Kindly review the draft and advise of any changes or corrections, preferably at least two or three days prior to your appointment.” The deceased died before the appointment. The sole issue before the court was whether the draft will set out the deceased’s testamentary intentions. In coming to their decision, Muszynski J. noted that in the case law dealing with court validated wills, it was evident that a key consideration was whether the deceased has demonstrated “a deliberate or fixed and final expression of intention as to the disposal of the deceased’s property on death”: Young Estate, Re, 2015 BCSC 182, 2015 CarswellBC 264 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 35; White v. White, 2023 ONSC 3740, 2023 CarswellOnt 9722 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 18; Skopyk Estate, 2017 BCSC 2335, 2017 CarswellBC 3561 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 21; Salmon v. Rombough, 2024 ONSC 1186, 2024 CarswellOnt 3088 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 115; Smith Estate, Re, 2016 BCSC 350, 2016 CarswellBC 521 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 19; and McKinlay v. Currie et al., 2025 ONSC 3471, 2025 CarswellOnt 9805 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 28. Muszynski J. noted that the applicant had relied on Grattan v. Grattan (February 1, 2023), Doc. 22-0054 (Ont. S.C.J.), to support her position that a draft will can be validated pursuant to s. 21.1 of the SLRA if the court is satisfied it reflects the testamentary intentions of the deceased. Muszynski J. observed that aside from Grattan, courts in Ontario have more frequently allowed applications under s. 21.1 of the SLRA to cure technical deficiencies to a signed will. The court noted that in Hejno v. Hejno, 2025 ONCA 876, 2025 CarswellOnt 20944 (Ont. C.A.), a draft will was validated by the application judge pursuant to s. 21.1 of the SLRA. As it was unopposed, the application judge did not issue reasons for judgment. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and noted that without “the benefit of reasons in the court below or full argument before us, this is not an appropriate case for us to definitively determine the legal test that governs applications under s. 21.1 of the SLRA.” Muszynski J. stated that the validation of an improperly executed or otherwise deficient will is a fact specific inquiry that often requires reliance on extrinsic evidence. Muszynski J. noted that the applicant had put forward evidence on instances where the deceased had expressed his intentions with respect to the disposal of his property, however the court cited Madhani v. Fast, 2025 ONSC 4100, 2025 CarswellOnt 11207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Estates List]), where the court said, “expressions of intentions as to how a testator would like their property to be disposed of after death are not testamentary intentions. Expressions of intentions, alone, are insufficient to ground a valid will.” Muszynski J. noted that this distinction between expressions of intentions and testamentary intentions was at the heart of this case and the applicant had not satisfied the court that the draft reflected the deceased’s testamentary intentions, meaning his deliberate or fixed and final expression of intention as to the disposal of his property on death for the following reasons:
While there were some similarities between an updated, handwritten list of intended dispositions found in the deceased’s home and the draft will, there were notable discrepancies.
There was no evidence that the deceased reviewed the draft will.
The lawyer’s letter enclosing the draft will invited the deceased to review draft and to “advise of any changes or corrections” at least two to three days prior to the signing appointment.
The suggested deadline for the deceased to “advise of any changes or corrections” had not yet expired before he died.
While the lawyer’s evidence was that the deceased was clear in his instructions and had made up his mind as to who he wanted to benefit from his estate, he also acknowledged that he scheduled a follow-up appointment weeks later to allow him an opportunity to review the draft documents and make any requested changes or corrections.
Muszynski J. found that the draft will could not be validated by s. 21.1 of the SLRA. This was because “people change their minds” and the deceased appeared to have changed his mind on at least one occasion between the time he had made his handwritten list and the time he met with his lawyer and it was unclear whether he would have requested any further changes or corrections to the will before he returned to sign a final version: Smith v. Bechtel et al., 2026 ONSC 975, 2026 CarswellOnt 2113 (Ont. S.C.J.).
Child–Definition–Section 60 the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 [WESA] – The definition of “child” pertinent to s. 60 of WESA has recently been reopened in this case. This was an application by the defendants of an underlying claim, to strike that claim on the basis that there is no genuine issue for trial. The respondent had sought to vary the terms of the deceased’s will under s. 60 of WESA. At the time of making his will, the deceased had executed a Statutory Declaration, confirming, inter alia, that:
he never fathered, biologically or otherwise, any children, and as such, he has no lineal descendants;
he never adopted or legitimated any persons and has never, in any manner, claimed any person as his child;
he did not consider, and had never considered, the respondent to be his child;
he and the respondent voluntarily provided bodily samples and undertook paternity testing through the DNA Diagnostics Center; and
the DNA Report concluded that the probability of him being her parent was 0%.
The respondent’s mother and the deceased were married four months before her birth and she, on the other hand, alleged that in all respects the deceased presented himself to her and the world as her father. In support of their application to strike, the applicants submitted that the British Columbia Court of Appeal has dispositively decided that, for the purposes of s. 60 of the WESA, the definition of “child” is limited to a natural (that is, biological) or an adopted child in Peri v. Doman Estate, 2011 BCCA 401, 2011 CarswellBC 2623 (B.C. C.A.), and Hope v. Raeder Estate, 1994 CarswellBC 72, 2 B.C.L.R. (3d) 58 (B.C.C.A.). The applicants argued that the principle of stare decisis applied and that the court was bound by the Court of Appeal’s findings in Hope and Peri, and there is nothing in the instant case to justify a departure. The court decided for the respondent. It stated that [it] was not satisfied that stare decisis applied to bar all will variation claims from all non-biological and non-adoptive children saying at para. 36:
36 As the Court of Appeal has acknowledged, Peri and Hope did not operate to foreclose all wills variation claims brought non-biological or non-adoptive children. Indeed, the Court of Appeal expressly left open the possibility that the definition of “child” may be expanded beyond biological and adoptive children where the factual circumstances are compelling enough. The respondent claims that her situation is the factual matrix that could spur a shift in the law. Whether that claim is true is not a matter that can be decided summarily.
…
39 The Court of Appeal expressly recognized the possibility that, in the future, the definition of “child” for the purposes of s. 60 of WESA may be expanded. The crux of Ms. Stainer’s claim is that social norms regarding families and parent-child relationships have shifted over time such that her relationship with Mr. Landry ought to be recognized by WESA as conferring standing to her to bring a wills variation claim.
40 These are not issues that can be decided summarily. …
This release features updates to the commentary and case law in Chapters 5 (Judicial Measures), 6 (Sentencing), and 12 (Sentencing Under the YCJA).
Highlights
R. v. T.M., 2025 MBPC 78, 2025 CarswellMan 410 (Man. Prov. Ct.) – The young person was sentenced to a six-month deferred custody and supervision order followed by eighteen months’ probation for possessing a loaded, restricted weapon, contrary to Criminal Code s. 95(1). The sentencing judge determined that firearms possession virtually always met the criteria for consideration of custody as an exceptional case pursuant to YCJA s. 39(1)(d). In the instant case, the circumstances of the offence, which included the young person’s use of the gun in a gang fight where another person was murdered, constituted the clearest of cases and necessitated a custodial sentence.
R. v. T.M., 2025 ONCA 862, 2025 CarswellOnt 20482 (Ont. C.A.) – The limitations of the availability of a DCSO sentence to six months in length and non-serious violent offences do not violate s. 7 or s. 15(1) of the Charter. Accordingly, the illegal sentence of 24-month DCSO imposed by the sentencing judge was varied to a fit disposition of 18 months’ probation with conditions and a community service order of 100 hours. In upholding the constitutionality of YCJA s. 42(5) and s. 42(2)(p), the Court of Appeal conducted a contextualized analysis of the YCJA’s policy foundations and objectives, including recognizing young persons’ reduced moral culpability, holding them accountable for offending conduct and reducing the historical overincarceration of youth. The Court drew heavily on the Supreme Court of Canada’s analysis of YCJA principles in R. v. I.M., 2025 SCC 23. The Court of Appeal emphasized that it is an error in principle to treat proportionality or retribution as the dominant or isolated focus of youth sentencing. Rather, as clarified in R. v. I.M., youth accountability requires a holistic approach. The Court of Appeal also cited the robust conditions of youth probation as an important complement DCSOs and the YCJA sentencing regime as a whole in explaining why a DCSO does not and should not be interpreted as a parallel to an adult conditional sentence. Youth probation, in contrast with adult probation, can include conditions that are not restricted to rehabilitative objectives, thereby supplying accountability via proportionate sentences and meaningful consequences.
R. v. X.C., 2025 ONCJ 366, 2025 CarswellOnt 10954 (Ont. C.J.) – A young person is considered to be “at trial” for the purpose of appointment of counsel pursuant to YCJA s. 25(4) if they have rejected or been rejected for extrajudicial sanctions and the youth justice court is satisfied that they wish to contest the charges and will not be accepting a resolution with which duty counsel can assist them. Youth justice courts should develop procedures that minimize the need for young persons to spend inordinate and unnecessary amounts of time attending court. One example of an alternative to in court application hearings would be a protocol for youth court judges to consider such applications in chambers in writing. This kind of alternative process is more responsive to the objectives of the YCJA and does not waste judicial resources. (Editor’s Note: This decision rejects the reasoning in prior cases requiring that a young person actually be arraigned before a s. 25(4) application can be entertained.)
The Manitoba Law Library would like to acknowledge with gratitude that we are situated on Treaty One Territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Cree and Dakota peoples, and the homeland of the Métis Nation.
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