Looseleaf Updates – January 21

by | Jan 21, 2026 | Commentary, Corporate and Commercial Law, New Books, Practice Management, Wills and Estates | 0 comments

The following looseleaf texts have been updated:

The Oppression Remedy, Release No. 2, December 2025

What’s New in this Update

This release features substantial updates to the case law in Chapter 2: Who Can Claim Relief, Chapter 5: Conduct to Which the Oppression Remedy Applies, Chapter 6: Remedies: General Principles and Practical Applications, Chapter 7: The Oppression Remedy and Other Statutory Remedies and Chapter 8: Litigating an Oppression Claim.

Highlights

  • Chapter 2: Who Can Claim Relief-§ 2:6. Potential Shareholders- In Shifrin v. LDF Frozen Foods et al., the applicant sought a declaration that he was the beneficial owner of 15% of the outstanding sares of the corporate respondent, LDF Frozen Foods and that the individual respondents held those shares in trust for him. He also sought a declaration that he had standing as a “complainant” under the OBCA. The applicant claimed that there was an agreement that he would invest $100,000 in LDF and work at LDF and, as consideration, receive 15% of the shares of LDF. There was no dispute that the applicant paid the $100,000 and worked at LDF, but there was a dispute as to whether there was an enforceable agreement among the parties with respect to the 15% interest and whether the applicant’s $100,000 investment had been repaid. Justice Dietrich concluded that there was an enforceable agreement among the parties to provide the applicant with 15% of the shares of LDF and that the applicant complied with the terms of the agreement by investing the $100,000, which had not been repaid. Having concluded that the applicant was indeed the beneficial owner of 15% of the shares, Justice Dietrich then found that the applicant was a proper complainant under the oppression remedy and entitled to seek relief in the form of the production of financial records and other relevant documents, stating that “[t]he relief sought by Mr. Shifrin is also consisted with other decisions of the court and others across the country which have found that where a respondent has refused to issue shares and an applicant is contractually entitled to receive those shares a claim under the Oppression Remedy is appropriate”. (Shifrin v. LDF Frozen Foods et al., 2025 CarswellOnt 5372, 2025 ONSC 2095).
  • Chapter 2: Who Can Claim Relief-§ 2:7. Warrantholders and Other Beneficial Owners-With respect to the distinction between legal and beneficial ownership of shares of a corporation, in Dhaliwal v. Cheema, Kimmel J. was required to determine whether the complainants were beneficial owners of the shares of various transportation companies, notwithstanding that the corporate records reflected that the respondent was the sole shareholder. Justice Kimmel noted that “[c]orporate records play an important role in governance, are subject to a statutory obligation of accuracy, and are presumed to be accurate, absent compelling evidence to the contrary”, but that “[a]n oral agreement and understanding regarding the beneficial share ownership is the type of compelling evidence that can rebut the presumption of share ownership.” Justice Kimmel concluded that the presumption had been rebutted based on her assessment of the complainants’ capital and in-kind contributions at the formation of the business and the respondents’ conduct over the past two decades. Having concluded that the complainants were beneficial owners, she found that their reasonable expectation was to be treated as owners and to continue to participate in management. The failure of the respondent to recognize their status as owners and to exclude them from management was oppressive and unfairly prejudicial their interests. (Dhaliwal v. Cheema, 2025 Carswell Ont 707, 2025 ONSC 382).

Conflicts of Interest, Release No. 5, December 2025

What’s New in this Update:

This release delivers a comprehensive overhaul of Chapter 8 – rewritten, reorganized, and retitled “Conflicts of Interest by Practice Area”. The revised chapter includes updated commentary, case law and academic literature by practice area.

Highlights:

  • Conflicts of interest can arise in any area of law but tend to predominate when lawyers represent more than one client. For example, there are some specialized areas of practice where conflicts of interest have become part of the institutional setting. These specialized areas of practice include bankruptcy and insolvency law, family law, insurance, real estate and wills and estates law, where conflicts of interest tend to arise more frequently than other practice areas. This is so because of the duties inherent in the relationships between and among the various parties. But conflicts can arise in any area of practice and there are many variables which give rise to what can be described as “systemic” conflict of interest issues. The first is the nature of the transaction that occurs between the parties. In real estate matters, for example, the parties may use an intermediary, a real estate agent, who has an interest in earning a commission by selling the property, and a bank that will provide a mortgage to the buyer. In some situations, it may be appropriate for one lawyer to act for multiple parties, but since the parties to the transaction may have different motives, conflicts can arise. A conflict of interest can exist even though the interests of the parties initially coincide. There is a myth, largely due to the use of “conflict” in “conflict of interest” that for a conflict of interest to exist there must be an adverse interest at stake or some form of contentious proceedings. The drafting of a separation agreement in a family matter or the preparation of a partnership agreement, particularly if there are several parties involved, can in fact give rise to a conflict of interest. The parties may share the same goals and objectives, but they may in fact disagree, or have divergent interests, in achieving these goals. The basic principles of adequate disclosure and consent remain the same as they do for matters that are contentious. The rules of professional conduct recognize that, in addition to the existence of a real or actual conflict of interest, there may be the appearance of a conflict of interest or the potential for a conflict of interest to occur.

Widdifield On Executors And Trustees, 6th Ed. Release No. 1, January 2026

What’s New in This Update:

This release contains amendments and updates to the commentary in Chapter 2 (Assets); Chapter 3 (Claims Against the Estate for Debts); Chapter 5 (Bequests and Beneficiaries); Chapter 15 (Resignation, Removal and Appointment of Trustees); and Chapter 17 (Dependants’ Relief Claims and Spousal Property on Death).

Highlights of This Release, Include:

  • Dependants’ Relief – Moral Obligation to Create Henson Trust – The court was asked to consider whether the testator breached her moral obligation by not putting an adult child’s inheritance into a Henson trust. The testator had three adult children. The testator’s will provided for modest bequests to her two grandchildren, with the remainder of the estate to be divided between each of her three children. The estate was a significant size, each child was to receive more than $ 1.8 million. The plaintiff, one of the testator’s children, was receiving government disability benefits and resided in social housing. It had been determined that the plaintiff was unable to work, and she received disability assistance. Eligibility for housing was based on provincial housing guidelines. She commenced a summary application seeking to vary her mother’s will to add terms that would place her share of the estate in a fully discretionary trust (Henson Trust). The intended impact of the discretionary trust was to ensure that the plaintiff would not lose her entitlement to disability benefits, and therefore her housing. The application to vary the will was dismissed with leave to re-apply. The court found that the only relevant determination was whether the testator, by leaving the plaintiff a direct distribution, failed to make adequate provision for her because she had failed to create the trust. The court stated that the factors in the application giving rise to concern included the size of the plaintiff’s inheritance and that, although disability benefits provided for subsistence level standard of living, evidence regarding the plaintiff’s expenses beyond what was covered through her disability benefits was sparse. The evidence fell short of allowing the court to conclude that the plaintiff would lose her housing if she received her inheritance by way of direct distribution. Overall, the evidence of the plaintiff’s current arrangements was of limited value in determining whether the testator failed to satisfy her moral obligations to provide for the plaintiff’s maintenance. In these circumstances, the court held that it was not possible for it to find that the testator failed to make adequate provision for the plaintiff’s proper maintenance and support. The court went on to note that if the plaintiff’s share of the estate provided her with sufficient funds to meet all of her needs and many of her wants, without resort to publicly funded disability benefits, the provisions of the will may be entirely appropriate: Damgaard v. Damgaard Estate, 2025 BCSC 208, 2025 CarswellBC 334 (B.C. S.C.).
  • Competency of Executor’s – Animosity between Co-Executors – A coexecutor brought an application to “pass over” her brother who had been named in her father’s will as her co-executor of his estate. The grounds for her application was the personal animosity between herself and her brother. She argued that because of this they could not work together to administer the estate. Her brother disagreed and maintained that he was ready and willing to put his personal feelings aside and administer the estate according to his father’s wishes. He stated that he could work with his sister and act impartially. The court dismissed the application, finding it premature to say that the animosity between the parties would necessarily jeopardize the proper and efficient administration of the estate or the welfare of the beneficiaries. At the point at which the application was brought, the parties had not attempted to work together: Parkinson Estate (Re), 2025 BCSC 152, 2025 CarswellBC 212 (B.C.S.C.).
  • Division of Property – Determination of Ownership of Property – Equitable Presumption of Tenancy in Common – Applicability to Col-operative Housing – A husband and wife owned one share in a corporation and 200 common shares of W Co-operative Housing Inc. The corporation owned title to W, which was a housing co-operative. Title to the co-operative housing units at W were held by way of a share in the corporation, rather than holding title directly. The share certificate set out the registered owners as the husband and wife but there was no indication whether the share was owned as tenants in common or as joint tenants. The wife died in 2021, and the husband died in 2022, but they had lived apart for decades. The wife’s will left the husband her interest in W. The husband’s estate brought a motion for a declaration that it was the sole beneficial and legal owner. The motion was granted. The court found that the husband and wife held their share in the corporation, as well as the common shares in W, jointly. The wife’s share passed to the husband by way of survivorship upon her death. Therefore, the husband’s estate was the sole beneficial and legal owner of the shares. The equitable presumption of tenancy in common did not apply. The definition of “land” in the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.34 (CLPA), could not be expanded to apply to shares in the co-operative housing unit. Therefore, the common law presumption of joint tenancy applied, the share was jointly owned, and presumptions in s. 14 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, applied. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of resulting trust: there was no evidence of any intention to not take the shares as joint tenants, nor that the parties had attempted to sever their interests; the documents did not indicate specific interests; there was no evidence as to the parties’ contributions to the purchase price; the parties were not divorced; and neither equitable presumptions nor the CLPA applied: Gruber v. Glickman Estate et al., 2025 ONSC 258, 2025 CarswellOnt 619 (Ont. S.C.J.).