The following looseleaf texts have been updated:
CANADIAN DIVORCE LAW AND PRACTICE, 2ND EDITION
Release No. 7, August 2026
Highlights
In this release the definition of “family violence” has been augmented to include the Supreme Court of Canada case Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, in which a new tort of intimate partner violence was recognized.
In recognizing a new tort of intimate partner violence, the Supreme Court of Canada differentiated “family violence” from “intimate partner violence”. In addition to including physical acts of violence and psychological abuse, the tort of intimate partner violence considered tactics of isolation, manipulation, humiliation, surveillance, economic abuse, sexual coercion, and intimidation that can control and entrap intimate partners.
See Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 CarswellOnt 7706, 2026 CarswellOnt 7707, 2026 SCC 16, 2026 CSC 16 (S.C.C.), reversing in part 2023 CarswellOnt 10325, 2023 ONCA 476 (Ont. C.A.), varying 2022 CarswellOnt 2367, 2022 ONSC 1303 (Ont. S.C.J.) and 2022 CarswellOnt 2986, 2022 ONSC 1549 (Ont. S.C.J.)
This release also updates cases that consider the appropriate quantum of spousal support payable when a payor spouse either exceeds the SSAG “ceiling” of $350,000 or does not meet the “floor” of $20,000. Notable cases include:
- The arbitrator erred by concluding that the SSAG formulas were of limited assistance on the basis that the husband’s income may be over the $350,000 SSAG ceiling. See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 2024 CarswellBC 131, 2024 BCCA 21 (B.C. C.A.).
- Taking into account the needs of the wife, the ability of the husband to pay, and fairness, not formulas, warranted support payable just under the low range of support as calculated by the SSAG using the husband’s full income for support purposes. See J.W.C. v. J.L.C., 2026 CarswellNfld 93, 2026 NLSC 46 (N.L. S.C.).
- The husband’s income significantly exceeded the SSAG ceiling, and spousal support was ordered at the low range of the SSAG, to terminate in10 years, where the wife had delayed efforts to become financially self-sufficient. See W1908 v. H1908, 2025 CarswellBC 2145, 2025 BCSC 1390 (B.C. S.C.).
- Where the husband’s retirement was reasonable in the circumstances, with an employment income of zero and possible investment income of $14,000 left his total income below the SSAG floor, and ongoing spousal support was terminated on an interim basis. See Kelly v. Gammon, 2022 CarswellAlta 174, 2022 ABQB 57 (Alta. Q.B.).
CANADIAN EMPLOYMENT LAW
Release No. 3, July 2026
What’s New in This Update
This release updates the case law and commentary in Chapter 33 (Prosecution) and Chapter 35 (Human Rights).
Highlights
Chapter 35 — I. Introduction — § 35:1. The Legislation — and Job Descriptions and Fiduciary Status – Although the Ontario Human Rights Code contains no express limitation restricting the tribunal’s jurisdiction to matters within provincial competence, it remains a provincial statute and cannot confer authority over matters that fall within Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction. The constitutional doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity prevents one level of government from legislating in a way that impairs the core of the other’s legislative powers: Trudel v. Meta Platforms Inc., 2026 ONSC 789 (Ont. Div. Crt.) at para. 20.
Chapter 35 — VI. Discrimination on the Basis of Disability — § 35:52. Physical Disability – In the course of finding that whether an element of a statutory human rights claim is made out is inherently a contextual fact-based inquiry and not a jurisdictional question, the Ontario Divisional Court emphasized that in Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montreal (City); Quebec (Commission de droits de la personne et des droit de la jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City), 2000 SCC 27 (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 665 (Boisbriand), the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the exclusive application of the bio-medical model of disability in favour of a contextual analysis that considers the socio-political dimensions of discrimination: Bokhari v. Top Medical Transportation Services, 2026 ONSC 1073 (Ont. Div. Crt.) at paragraphs 26, 49 and 51.
Chapter 35 — VI. Discrimination on the Basis of Disability — § 35:57. Perceived Disability – “At paragraph 54 of Bokhari v. Top Medical Transportation Services, 2026 ONSC 1073, the Ontario Divisional Court noted that while the Supreme Court in Boisbriand acknowledged that “normal ailments” like a cold “will generally not” constitute a disability because there is “normally not a negative bias” against these ailments, the court did not lay down a hard and fast rule that transitory injuries were necessarily excluded from the meaning of disability. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Canada was careful to emphasize that the multidimensional analysis of disability required under human rights legislation focuses on “obstacles to full participation in society rather than on the condition or state of the individual.”
Chapter 35 — VI. Discrimination on the Basis of Disability — XII. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex — § 35:90. Sexual Harassment — Requirement of a Sexual Component – The maker of offending comments need not have been motivated by the desire to engage in sexual relations with those to whom the comments are made for the comments to constitute sexual harassment. For example, distribution of pornography in the workplace, in and of itself, has been held to constitute sexual harassment: Westjet v. T.H., 2026 FCA 20 at paragraph 24 referencing Poliquin v. Devon Canada Corporation, 2009 ABCA 216 at paragraphs 55 to 60. Lewd comments and demeaning comments based on gender or sexual orientation have been found to constitute sexual harassment in the absence of any sexual intent on the part of the maker. In the Westjet case the, Federal Court of Appeal found that an arbitrator’s conclusion that the respondent’s repeated comments and questioning of co-workers about their sexual development and that of their female children, as well as his comments about a co-worker’s breasts did not amount to sexual harassment, contradicted the well-established case law on sexual harassment. The Federal Court of Appeal noted that the comments and questions were sexual in nature, were made repeatedly, and the respondent knew or should have known that they were inappropriate and unwelcome. The Federal Court of Appeal held that the arbitrator’s failure to follow established case law, or, at the very least to provide a rational analysis for the departure, rendered the decision unreasonable, at paragraph 29.
Chapter 35 — VI. Discrimination on the Basis of Disability — XV. Procedure — § 35:133. Other Avenues for Legal Redress for Breaches of Human Rights Legislation – In Weeks v. Abbotsford (City), 2025 BCSC 2120, a class action claim by former female police officers who alleged that they were subjected to gender or sexual orientation-based discrimination, harassment, and bullying by officers and management of British Columbia’s municipal police forces that arose during their employment, but unrelated to a dismissal, and that predated the collective agreement, was allowed to proceed. The issue of the negotiation of an article in a collective agreement can be distinct from its application or interpretation and thus, it can be a stand-alone issue or complaint over which a Human Rights Board of inquiry has jurisdiction: University of New Brunswick v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 3339, 2025 NBKB 231 at paragraphs 39 and 45 referencing Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 39.
CHILD PROTECTION LAW IN CANADA, 2ND EDITION
Release No. 6, July 2026
What’s New in This Update
This release features updates to Chapter 2 (Jurisdiction), Chapter 4 (Motions), Chapter 5 (Protection Application–The Threshold Finding), Chapter 6 (Protection Application–Dispositions), Chapter 8 (Evidence at Trial), Chapter 9 (Summary Proceedings and Agreements) and Chapter 10 (Access).
Highlights
Motions — Parental Alienation – It is insufficient on a motion to request and order for reunification counselling to simply state that the children won’t visit so therefore they must be alienated. Expert evidence is required to identify the cause of the family breakdown and that the counselling would actually benefit the children: Michael v. Gadallah, 2025 ONSC 334.
Motions — Interim Access – Under s. 94(8) of the Act, the court has broad discretion to impose terms and conditions on access orders, including financial ones, including the payment of transportation costs for a parent to attend access visits: Family and Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County v. T.S., 2026 ONCJ 148.
Protection Application — Dispositions — Temporary Committal Order – The court cautioned against imposing standard or overly broad conditions without evidence. The main concern was the parents’ ability to meet the child’s significant medical needs. While there was limited evidence of substance use, the court found it insufficient to justify strict conditions like addiction assessments or abstinence requirements: M.H.H.B., Re, 2026 SKKB 66.
Protection Application — Dispositions — Permanent Guardianship – All custody-related applications under the FLA must be heard before making a final decision about a child’s permanent placement with the Minister: New Brunswick (Minister of Social Development) v. L.K., 2026 NBKB 34.
REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LAND
Release No. 7, July 2026
What’s New in This Update
This release updates the commentary and caselaw in Chapter 5 (Functions of the Registrar), Chapter 6 (Land Descriptions and Registered and Deposited Plans of Survey), Chapter 13 (Mortgages), Chapter 15 (Lis Pendens), Chapter 18 (Statutory Exemptions to Indefeasibility of Title) and Chapter 20 (Builders’, Construction and Mechanics’ Lien Legislation).
Highlights
Land Descriptions and Registered and Deposited Plans of Survey–The Condominium Acts–The Condominium Corporation–Oppression Remedy – Gordon v. The Owners, Strata Plan EPS2300, 2026 BCCRT 654 – Applicant owner of only 3 commercial lots in mixed-use strata building challenges increase in commercial contribution requirement respecting common expenses; applicant alleges new allocation formula based on unit entitlement significantly unfair based increase in commercial share of common expenses from 16% to 21.45%; owner requests return to original allocation scheme and refund of unauthorized amounts paid; strata corporation alleges original allocation scheme violates Act which mandates use of unit entitlement as basis for allocation unless unanimous resolution adopted to approve alternative allocation scheme such that shares should always have been calculated on unit entitlement; strata represented and owner of commercial units reasonably expected share of only 16%; authorities state allocation of common expenses by unit entitlement can give rise to significant unfairness and 34% increase in amount paid towards common expenses is burdensome harsh or inequitable; good faith of strata corporation no defense; order for strata corporation to recalculate share of contributions based on original allocation scheme, determine amounts overpaid and underpaid based on years unit entitlement applied and adjust strata accounts accordingly.
Statutory Exceptions to Indefeasibility of Title–Any Public Highway–Ontario – Township of Cleariew et al. v. Wargon et al., 2026 ONSC 2252 – Dispute over ownership of land registered in respondent’s name and alleged to be highway by Township; Township seeks declaration of highway and rectification of title under s. 159 of Land Title Act; legal test for dedication turns on whether owner intended to dedicate land for public highway and road actually opened to and accepted by public; road opening bylaw not mandatory to establish acceptance of highway dedication especially given express dedication by deed and historical evidence of construction and use of road by public; at time of purchase, respondent knew land was used for public highway; adverse possession inapplicable to public highway and highway status unaffected by conversion to land title system; exercise of power of rectification respecting land used for public highway is exception to indefeasibility of title; since road registered on title, current owner not bona fide purchaser for value without notice; order for rectification to reflect Township’s ownership of public highway.
The following looseleaf subscriptions have resumed. The most recent update is highlighted below:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 5TH EDITION
Release No. 2, July 2026
What’s New in This Update
This release features updates to the case law and commentary in Chapters 1 (Sources), 9 (Responsible Government), 15 (Judicial Review on Federal Grounds), 16 (Paramountcy), 22 (Transportation and Communication), 39 (Override of Rights), 40 (Enforcement of Rights), 43 (Expression), 45 (Voting), 47 (Fundamental Justice), 51 (Rights on Being Charged), 52 (Trial Within Reasonable Time), and 53 (Cruel and Unusual Punishment).
Highlights
Distribution of Power — Judicial Review on Federal Grounds — Characterization of Laws — Double aspect – The double aspect doctrine is not a primary doctrine that, like the pith and substance doctrine (and the ancillary powers doctrine), provides a free-standing analytical framework that can be applied in determining whether a law is valid. It is a secondary doctrine that, when invoked, is folded into the analysis of whether a law is valid under the pith and substance doctrine (and the ancillary powers doctrine). This raises the obvious question: at which step of the pith and substance doctrine should the double aspect doctrine be addressed if invoked? The double aspect doctrine is most relevant to the analysis at the second step of the pith and substance doctrine (the classification step), which, recall, requires a determination of whether the matter of a challenged law falls within a head of power allocated to the level of government that enacted it. Under the double aspect doctrine, a law will be found to be valid at the classification step if it relates to an “aspect” of a matter that falls within a head of power allocated to the enacting level of government, even though the matter has another aspect that falls within a head of power allocated to the other level of government. However, the double aspect doctrine will likely also subtly influence the analysis at the first step of the pith and substance doctrine (the characterization step), which, recall, requires a determination of the matter (or pith and substance) of the challenged law. This is because the courts – as noted in an earlier section – tend to use concepts that will assist in classifying a law at the second step of the pith and substance analysis when they characterize a law at the first step of the pith and substance analysis, despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s entreaty – also noted in that earlier section – that the courts keep the two steps of the pith and substance analysis distinct. This explains why the double aspect doctrine is addressed in the part of this chapter relating to the characterization of a law under the pith and substance doctrine, rather than the part of the chapter relating to the classification of a law under the pith and substance doctrine (even though, as noted, the double aspect doctrine is also – indeed particularly – relevant to the classification of a law).
Civil Liberties — Enforcement of Rights — Remedy Clause — Apprehended infringements – In R. v. Varennes (2025), the Supreme Court of Canada awarded a s. 24(1) remedy for another Charter infringement that it feared might occur in the future. In that case, the accused, who was charged with the second-degree murder of his spouse, was to stand trial in September 2020, only a few months after the initial outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the months leading up to the trial, various public health restrictions were instituted to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, including a suspension of jury trials. In June 2020, to avoid potential COVID-19 related delays, the accused requested a trial by judge alone, which is allowed under the Criminal Code if both the accused and the Crown consent. The accused argued that potential COVID-19 delays to jury trials risked infringing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time. However, the Crown refused to consent to a trial by judge alone for public interest reasons. The accused brought a motion seeking an order for a judge-alone trial in the superior court without Crown consent. The trial judge granted the accused’s motion for a judge-alone trial and, at the end of his trial, acquitted him of second-degree murder, convicting him of manslaughter instead. The case ended up in the Supreme Court on appeal, where the central issue was whether the trial judge had the jurisdiction to order a judge-alone trial without Crown consent. Karakatsanis J., who wrote for the majority of the Court, held that the trial judge had the jurisdiction to order a judge-alone trial without Crown consent under the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts. However, she declined to resolve the standard that should be applied in determining whether to exercise this jurisdiction because she held that s. 24(1) also provided the trial judge the jurisdiction to order a judge-alone trial without Crown consent. The trial judge had concluded that COVID-19 related delays to jury trials would likely have infringed the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b), and so had the jurisdiction to order a judge-alone trial without Crown consent as a remedy under s. 24(1).
Note: all text under “What’s New in this Update” and “Highlights” sections is taken verbatim from documents received from the publisher. MLL is not responsible for errors in this content.
Great LEXpectations RSS Feed